Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 15

Number 1

Article 11

December 2019

Are There Individual Property Rights in Clouds
Ralph M. Wade

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Ralph M. Wade, Are There Individual Property Rights in Clouds, 15 WYO. L.J. 92 (1960)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol15/iss1/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

NVOMING

LA.W JOURNAL

It appears that many courts tend to lighten the plaintiff's burden of proof
in their instructions to the jury by means such as the establishment of
presumptions concerning the use of firearms and the shifting of the burden
of proof to the defendant by allowing the plaintiff to base his case on
evidence sufficient only to support a case under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
An increasingly severe attitude in the courts, concerning hunting
82
accidents, coupled with broader and more particularized criminal statutes,
concerned with negligence, have caused more and more hunting accidents
to be the subject of criminal rather than civil liability in recent years.33
Civil liability suits on the other hand have decreased because the record
of unsuccessful defendants in such cases has prompted a greater number
of out of court settlements. We may conclude that it is desirable that
strict liability should be imposed upon the hunter in his use of firearms
because, as Harris says in his article Liability Without Fault:
The best way to secure proper care and caution in present day
society 34is to throw the risk of damage upon the person who chooses
to act.

ROBERT C.

KELLY

ARE THERE INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CLOUDS?
Technical advances in weather control and particularly that phase
known as rain-making have posed many new and interesting problems for
the lawyer as well as for the scientist 1t The former is confronted with
such problems as whether or not individual rights have been affected
by the prevention of rain, excessive rain, accidents arising out of hazardous
highways, and destruction of crops as a result of man's interference with
natural rain fall. Unfortunately the attorney will find no reported cases
to help him with such problems.
One recent case, Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville,
Texas2 has, however, raised the unique question of a property owner's right
to the clouds over his land. The plaintiffs, ranchers residing in a west
Texas county, were granted a temporary injunction against owners and
32.
3.3.

34.
1.
2.

Variously termed (depending upon the jurisdiction) as negligent homicide, involuntary manslaughter, second degree manslaughter, or manslaughter arising from
an act of culpable negligence.
The treatment of these subjects by the American Law Reports Series indicate a
trend. Civil liability has not been the subject of an annotation since 1928 (53
A.L.R. 1205) but the 1929 annotation on criminal liability (63 A.L.R. 1232) has
benn superceded by a new annotation as late as 1952 (23 A.L.R.2d 1402). The
fact that both the anotations on criminal liability are later than the one on civil
liability indicate that the field of criminal liability for hunting accidents is growing
and that a greater number of cases worthy of note are found in that field.
Harris, Liability Without Fault, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 337, 868 (1932).
Weather Under Control, Fortune Magazine (Feb. 1948).
320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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operators of equipment used in what they called a "weather modification
program" and those who contracted for their service. The latter were also
ranchers whose aim was to prevent widespread damage from hail storms
which frequently occurred in that section of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that
the weather modification activities interferred with the clouds and the
precipitation which might come therefrom while over their land. They
asked the court to protect them in their right to the benefit and enjoyment
of their land.
The trial court found that the operators were flying over plaintiffs'
land and into the clouds above and engaging in activities that did change
their content and cause them to dissipate and scatter. The clouds were
thus prevented from following their usual and natural course of developing
rain over the plaintiffs' land.
The case was appealed by the defendants, who protested the issuance
of the injunction on the ground that they were following a lawful occupation, had every right to protect their crops from hail and that the evidence
did not justify the issuance of the injunction. They further contended
that appellees had no right to prevent them from flying over their land,
that no one owned the clouds unless it be the state and finally that the
injunction was too broad in its terms.
The appellees urged that the owner of the land also owns in connection therewith certain so-called natural rights and cited a quotation from
Spann v. City of Dallas:
Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal.
Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that
extent destroys the property itself. The substantial value of
property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value
of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren
right.3
The higher court recognized appellees rights to the clouds over their
property but narrowed the injunction to the extent necessary to prevent
appellant from seeding clouds directly over appellees' land.
In order to establish a property right in moveables, property law has
long required the assertion of control through occupancy and the intent
of the occupier to appropriate for his own use. 4 Many things, such as
air, runing water, the sea, flying birds and animals' ferae naturae remained
outside the realm of private property because they are physically beyond
occupancy. Blackstone stated it as follows:
Fire, light, air and water.., a man can have no absolute property
in these as he may have in the earth and land; since there are of a
vague and fugative nature, and therefore can admit only of a
3.
4.

111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
Chases' Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 213 (4th ed. 1914).
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precarious and qualified ownership, which lasts so long as they are
in actual use and occupancy, but no longer.5
Considered on this basis it would seem that clouds in their natural
state are not subject to private ownership, hence one would have no cause
for an action based upon an interference therewith. However, it has been
held that a landowner can have rights in some elements that are beyond
occupancy. The right is based upon the theory that the owner of land has
a right to be protected from unreasonable interference 6 with the use of his
property in its natural condition, including the water of a flowing stream
thereon. 7 In some jurisditcions the right has been upheld upon the basis
of a trespass theory; in others one riparian owner cannot prevent the use
of water by another unless he can establish that unreasonable use by the
latter has deprived him of a beneficial use. 8
Among other commonly recognized rights of a landowner where
occupancy and control are not require are: (1) the right to the support of
land; 9 (2) the right to natural drainage of land; 10 (3) the right to natural
diffusion of air free from smoke, dust or pollution;". (4) the right to use
the land for a reasonable purpose such as farming.'
It would seem to follow from the basic principles of property law
deevloped in riparian right, support and pollution cases that all forms
of natural precipitation are elements of the natural condition of the
land and as. such contitute rights which the courts will protect as essential
to the owner's use and enjoyment. However, in an early weather modification case, Slutsky v. City of New York,'

3

the plaintiff, a resort owner in

the watershed area over which clouds were being seeded, sought to enjoin
permanently the City of New York from continuing its cloud seeding to
increase precipitation. The court denying the petition set forth the
following pertinent remarks in its opinion:
This court must balance conflicting interests between a remote
possibility of inconvenienec to the plaintiffs' resort and its guests
with the problem of maintaining and supplying the inhabitants
of the City of New York and surrounding areas with a population
of 10 million inhabitants, with an adequate supply of pure wholesome water. The relief which the plaintiffs ask is opposed to the
general welfare and public good; and the dangers which plaintiffs
This court will not protect a
apprehend are purely speculative.
4
positive public advantage.'
Lewis' Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of Englands, 395 (Book II, 1900).
Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. St. Anthony Falls Waterpower Co., 82 Minn. 505, 85
N.W. 520 (1901).
7. Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 150 Cal. 520, 89 Pac. 338 (1907);
I Stan. L. Rev. 53-56 (1958).

5.
6.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

Gilis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 At. 18 (1892).
Sime v. Jensen, 213 Minn. 476, 7 N.W.2d 325 (1942).
Gray v. McWilliams, 98 Cal. 157, 32 Pac. 976 (1893; Duenow v. Lindeman, 233 Minn.
505, 27 N.W.2d 421 (1947).

Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 Atl. 702 (1894).
1 Wiel, Water Rights in Western States, 774 (3d ed. 1911).
Slutsky v. New York, 97 N.Y. Supp.2d 238 (1950).
Ibid., 240.
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The court also stated without further discussion or citation of legal
authority, that plaintiff clearly had no vested property rights in the clouds
or the moisture therein. The latter remark would appear to be dictum
in view of the above quotation embodying the thinking with respect to
the public advantage as opposed to possible private injury. It would
further appear that the court's decision is based not only the above
consideration but also upon the failure of the plaintiff to establish actual
rather than possible harm to his business.
In the Texas case, the holding recognized a property right to natural
rainfall, but the court expressly stated that the injunction to protect such
rights would issue only for interference with clouds over plaintiffs' property,
thus in effect adopting a theory of trespass. 15
It is of interest to note that in a Washington case 6 which is quite
similar factually to the Texas case the court refused to grant a permanent
injunction to the plaintiffs when it concluded, on the basis of expert
meterological testimony presented, that the cloud seeding to prevent hail
had not brought about exceptional rainfall and flash floods on the farms
adjacent to the hail prevention target area. Plaintiffs later voluntarily
dismissed their suit for damages.
In most of the litigated cases to date, and they are certainly few in
number, 17 the actions have been brought to secure damages for too much
rain, rather than deprivation of natural rainfall as in the Texas case. For
example in Samples v. Irving P. Krick, Inc.,s an Oklahoma case, the theory
of the plaintiff was negligent in cloud seeding under existing weather conditions. Not proying his case to the satisfaction of the jury the verdict was
for the defendant.
Currently there seems to be no generally accepted theory which would
establish a landowner's property rights in the clouds or even to the moisture
therein. Should the courts adopt a theory analogous to the reasonable
use doctrine of a riparian land-owner's right to water, said owner would not
have to prove that injury occurred while the clouds were over his land.
In the case of water in a running stream it is sufficient for the riparian
owner to prove unreasonable depletion even though it occurred upstream.
It is admitted that, with respect to clouds, it would be very difficult to
prove that injury actually occurred while the clouds were over the plaintiff's
land. Approached from the reasonable use doctrine the Slutsky case could
be rationalized because the determination of what constituted a reasonable
15.
16.
17.
18.

Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958).
Auvil Orchard Co. v. Weather Modification, Inc., and Apple Weather, Inc., Cause
No. 19268, Superior Court, Chelan County, Wash. (1956).
Oppenheimer, Considerations In Weather Modification, State Government (May,
1957).
Civil Nos. 6212, 6223. 6224, W.D. Okla. (1954).
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depletion was based upon public policy measured in terms of social
benefit.1x
In the few reported cases arising out of weather control activities the
reasoning has usually been based upon traditional legal rules about the law
of torts (negligence) to property, doctrines of equity and current ideas
about public policy. However, it* must realized that the current concept of property rights is the result of growth or evolution as new situations
have arisen. The law of real property developed in response to need.
Property rights in clouds were not determined either by statute or
decisional law prior to the advent of rainmaking because no problems
involving such rights arose.
If property is viewed as a cluster of usages which operate to distribute
the supply of available scarcities, new property rights should arise whenever
technological advances or social changes reveal a new scarcity.20 To
illustrate, the doctrine of ad coclum, which asserts that he who owns the
surface of the land also owns the space to the sky above, was for many
years unchallenged because no problem arose therefrom. With the coming
of modern aviation, however, came the realization that the doctrine would
retard its development. Consequently it was urged that ownership be
limited to the "lower air space" that which was necessary and convenient
for the enjoyment of the land. 2 ' It is apparent then, that this ancient
common law doctrine cannot be appropriately applied to establish ownership in clouds.
Today as a result of technological advancement, radio and television
stations have allotted certain wave lengths or frequencies upon which to
broadcast. Whether or not a station has a property right in the signal it
disseminates is currently a matter of litigation.2 2 Certainly such intangibles
are not subject to possession or occupancy in the same manner as a piece
of land. Statutory and court made law will eventually provide the answer.
In 1951 the Wyoming Legislature, cognizant of the technological advances in weather modification, enacied legislation that explicitly lays a
legal foundation for the treatment of water in the clouds within the State's
boundaries like water in its streams.23 Such water or moisture was expressly
claimed for the use of its residents and the State's best interests. 2 4 The
statute's wording bears a strong resemblance to the Constitutional provision
relative to the appropriability of "water of all natural streams, springs,
lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the
state. ..
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Coslev, Property-Rights of Private Landowners To Rainfall, 4 Viii. L. Rev. 603
(1959) .
Powell, The Law of Real Property, Vol. I,23 (1949).
Hinman v. United Air Lines Transport Co., 84 F.2d 755 (1936).
Property Rights Test Filed, Broadcasting, 78 (May 4, 1959).
Final Report, Advisory Committee on Weather Control, Vol. II, 216 (1957).
§ 9-.267. W.S. 1957.
Vyo. Const. Art. VIII.

NOTES

Apparently one objective of the statute is to encourage research and
experimentation with artificial rainmaking and weather modification and
to obtain and record scientific data which will contribute toward protection
of life, property and the public interest. At the same time it declares that
nothing in the act should be construed to impose or accept liability or
responsibilility on the part of the state or its employees for any weather
modification activities carried on by private persons or groups. Furthermore,
the law is not to affect in anyway any contractual, tortious or other legal
rights or liabilities between private persons or groups. 26
In conclusion it may be emphasized that while at present there is no
clear-cut doctrine relative to a landowner having a property right in a cloud
over his land, the courts have held that he does have, subject to paramount
social interests, a right to the amount of moisture therefrom which would
in the natural course of affairs benefit his land. This right may be safeguarded through an action for tresspass but whether this remedy is adequate is certainly questionable.
RALPH M. WADE
26.

§§ 9-267, 276, W.S. 1957.

